On March 31, 1939, British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain announced a new strategic alliance.
“In the event of any action which clearly threatened Polish independence…His Majesty’s Government would feel themselves bound at once to lend the Polish Government all support in their power…I may add that the French Government has authorized me to make it plain that they stand in the same position in this matter as do His Majesty’s Government.”
The British and French, sensing the inevitability of German aggression, promised unequivocally to defend Poland. And through the spring and summer of 1939, Poland relied upon these British and French promises. Poland wasn’t stupid. They fully recognized they couldn’t defeat Germany. But with the British and French pledging to fully mobilize in Poland’s defense, the Poles believed they could hold Germany off, just long enough, so that when Germany forces were diverted from Poland to address Britain and France, the Poles could counterattack.
When Hitler did attack, in September 1939, the British and French balked, leaving Poland to defend herself. Retroactively, we learned Britain nor France never intended to defend Poland. The promises were a “political bluff.”
Poland fell quickly, and, over the course of the war, lost 6 million citizens. Poland’s Jewish population (3mil.) and culture were effectively erased. And after the war’s conclusion, Poland suffered four decades under Soviet rule.
Had Britain or France been forthright with Poland, as she prepared for Germany’s advance, Poland would have enjoyed a decision-making process that was grounded in reality: they were on their own. Would Poland have fought anyway? Perhaps. It’s hard to say, obviously, but it seems unlikely that Poland would have gone so hard had they known they were alone. Regardless, it seems clear, false western promises heavily influenced Poland’s catastrophic strategy.
Sound familiar?
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, currently hanging on in Kyiv, seems surprised that the West has not joined to fight back the Russian invaders. Like Poland in 1939, Zelenskyy seems surprised to find himself alone. His contemporary rhetoric, and his actions pre-invasion, suggest he believed the West would indeed help. And why wouldn’t he? In January, a bipartisan group of US senators met with Zelenskyy and soothingly pledged support against the gathering Russians.
Perhaps, had Zelenskyy known the truth—that the West would not help—Ukraine could have adjusted their strategy accordingly. It’s hard to imagine that having a sit-down with Senators Chris Murphy, Amy Klobuchar, Rob Portman, and co., did not factor into Ukraine’s decision making both before and during the Russian invasion. Could Ukraine have sued for peace with Russia? Was a diplomatic solution available, somewhere, before the invasion began? Unclear. But Zelenskyy was elected, in part, to establish peace, so we know he had popular support for the process.
What is clear, is that Ukraine faces an existential crisis. In the near future, the Ukrainian regime may cease to exist. It seems unlikely that a regime would craft strategy that resulted so quickly and concretely in their own demise without an egregious miscalculation. For Ukraine, as with Poland, that miscalculation appears to have been reliance on hollow Western promises. Now, Britain and France did eventually confront Germany—whose push for hegemony posed an existential threat to the continent. Russia’s contemporary push into Ukraine is not about hegemony—and should not prompt an eventual US intervention.
To be clear, I don’t think the US should intervene in Ukraine—a position I stated clearly in January. Yet, if the US had no intention of intervening, they should have let the Ukrainians know, rather than prop them up with “political bluffs.” And Western culpability does not begin with recent bluffs, whispered softly in Zelenskyy’s ear, but with an old bluff, told straight-faced to Gorbachev: NATO will not move “one inch eastward.”
Russia’s incursion, while condemnable, illegal, and horrifying, was predictable. Actually, my New York Transatlantic debut, written eighteen months ago, details NATO’s eastern creep and Russia’s corresponding insecurity. Indeed, the US, and the West, deserve a portion of the blame for Ukraine’s ongoing crisis.
Regardless, US provocations do not absolve Putin’s criminal invasion.
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