Most Europeans are pleased with the 2020 US presidential election results. President-elect Joe Biden has defeated incumbent President Donald Trump. As Biden’s team mobilizes for transition, the public speculates over who will populate a Biden administration—and what policies they will pursue.
Inclined to accommodate, Biden will feel pressure from both sides of the US political spectrum. On the left, progressives who had honored an inter-party truce in order to defeat President Trump will now assert their agenda items vigorously. Biden is not a progressive—but he recognizes the zeitgeist and may pay lip service to a progressive policy item or two. Don’t expect many progressive appointments, however.
Biden also recognizes how starkly divided the US has become. These divisions offend Biden’s bipartisan nature—he may appoint moderate Republicans in the spirit of unity.
Once Biden is sworn into office on January 20, he will make his most direct impact where all presidents make their most direct impact: foreign policy. And the number one foreign policy item for Biden will be identical to Trump’s number one foreign policy item: China. But the US-EU relationship has global implications and will occupy Biden’s bandwidth too. Let’s anticipate the Biden administration’s agenda and tactics for Europe.
Biden will terminate Trump’s ‘America First’ doctrine. In taking steps to re-engage America in global, and European, affairs, Biden’s most immediate move will be rejoining the Paris Agreement. Biden has promised to rejoin the Paris Agreement on the very first day of his term—a sharp rebuke of Trump climate policy and ‘America First’ generally. The Paris Agreement is not singularly a facet of the US-EU relationship, of course, but the greater implication is that Biden intends to use multilateral tactics and reestablish American global leadership. By rejoining the Paris Agreement, Biden will set a new tone for US-EU relations on day one of his administration.
The new tone should make US-EU trade discussions easier—but not easy. Biden may not be inclined to fully reverse Trump’s trade policy. Trump’s trade policy with Europe was not just an ‘America First’ aberration. The Boston Tea Party, Smoot-Hawley Act, the 2002 Steel Tariff–the US and Europe have a history of trade disputes.
Biden will inherit an escalating trade skirmish. Actually, the escalations have continued even after Trump’s electoral defeat. Biden can expect to deal with four significant obstacles in the US-EU trade relationship: Trump’s metal tariff, a digital service tax, a potential carbon border tax, and the Boeing-Airbus rivalry. These obstacles will be intact after Trump leaves office.
Biden may be inclined to form a transatlantic free trade agreement—something Obama failed to accomplish. But the domestic political atmosphere may further complicate Biden’s ability to arrange a trade deal with Europe. In the US, protectionist trade policies are gaining popularity with the right and left. Resultantly, Biden may face pressure to protect American workers, rather than allow free trade to accelerate globalization—which is basically Trump’s trade philosophy. Biden will need to operate deftly to increase transatlantic trade and boost the flagging global economy, while still guarding the interests of American workers.
Then there’s China to consider. China has become so relevant internationally that much of Biden’s European policy will be geared towards countering Chinese influence on the European continent. Again, this will represent a continuation of Trump policy—there is consensus between Republicans and Democrats that China must be balanced against.
Complicating this objective is Germany’s economic entanglement with China. German Chancellor Angela Merkel remains pro-engagement with China. Merkel is retiring, and her successor may not share her views with respect to China, but for now, the Germany-China relationship will complicate the US agenda.
Fortunately, the EU has generally been trending away from China. This trend should make Biden’s life easier. Especially considering that this trend is accelerating independently of US involvement—indeed, the primary catalyst for Europe’s shift away from China is China’s own behavior. Chinese actions like intellectual property theft, forced technology transfers, coercive methods, illiberalism, and failure to open markets for European companies has prompted the EU to find alternatives to China (not to mention Hong Kong crackdowns and Muslim concentration camps). Essentially, China is doing Biden’s job for him.
I recently discussed NATO, in more depth, here. To summarize, Trump was correct—the European NATO members should contribute more to their own defense spending, rather than rely so heavily on the US. That sentiment is not unique to Trump. But Trump is the first president to suggest that Article 5 participation might be conditioned on European defense spending. Reportedly, Trump even discussed withdrawing the US from NATO. In doing so, Trump raised doubts over whether the US was fully committed to NATO. This puts Biden in a difficult situation: he must reaffirm US commitment to NATO (he will; he’s a well-documented supporter of transatlantic cooperation) while simultaneously sustaining Trump-like (Obama-like, Eisenhower-like) pressure on European NATO members to properly burden-share. Biden should have the upper hand here; Europe is dependent on the US for security, after all. But the friction that has undergirded NATO relations for decades will persist into Biden’s term.
Biden will take control of the executive branch at a time when the US government, and US society, is uniquely fractured. The fractures won’t reduce Biden’s power with respect to US foreign policy—but he will be navigating a complicated political climate to solve problems, European and otherwise, that Trump’s removal from office won’t solve. Europeans should curb their optimism—but they are correct to view Biden as an upgrade for transatlantic cooperation.
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