Relations between Washington and Beijing have already deteriorated sharply with the onset of Donald Trump’s presidency. COVID-19, however, has dragged them to new lows as it maintains its grip on the world economy. From disputes over the origin of what Trump provocatively termed the “Chinese virus” to pressure on the disentanglement of the world’s economic powerhouses, the global health crisis has given the geopolitical competition for world primacy sharper teeth. Moreover, the challenge of fighting the virus to save human lives has molded into a great power battle between two antithetical systems. As global affairs are increasingly shaped by the US-China rivalry, Europe struggles to find its place — and these shifting dynamics have important implications for the future of the international order.

Trump’s unilateral Section 301 tariffs on billions of dollars’ worth of Chinese goods appeared to mark the climax in a trade war between the world’s most powerful country and its increasingly assertive challenger. But to claim that tensions have since then been alleviated would be false. In the United States, as in many European countries, the pandemic-induced ruptures of cross-border supply networks have only fueled apprehension toward foreign dependence, particularly vis-à-vis China. Shortages of lifesaving health equipment like medical masks and ventilators, but also of valuable raw materials and semiconductors have exposed the costly vulnerabilities of deep economic entanglement. As the Chief Economist of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Beata Javorcik, summarized, “One province of China went on lockdown, and suddenly factories all over the world don’t have supplies. That drove home the point of how reliant we are on China, and how little redundancy we have.”

The pandemic has served as a chance to address the shifting geopolitical landscape through more confrontation and assertiveness. The Biden administration has built on Trump’s detachment strategy of containing China’s increasingly aggressive rise to power. President Biden has widened the scope of sanctions against Chinese officials and restricted American investments in Chinese firms linked to the military or surveillance technology. He has also drawn on the collective pressure of allies, even as the strain put on the transatlantic friendship during the Trump years has induced the European Union to seek more strategic autonomy. The European Commission has drawn up its own strategy to confront Beijing, declaring it a strategic rival in 2019, but recognized that its leverage largely hinges on the US. European countries have sided with Washington in imposing sanctions on Chinese officials for mounting human rights abuses in Xinjiang and crackdowns in Hong Kong. In addition, the EU has frozen its ratification process of the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI), which aims to level the playing field for European companies and investors in the Chinese market. Parallel to Biden’s “Build Back Better World” infrastructure plan, the EU has also introduced its “Global Gateway” initiative for a “sustainable and trusted” alternative to Xi’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). 

The deepening rift among the world’s most important economies is alarming in light of the idea that economic cooperation and interdependence are important inhibitors of war. After all, this logic formed the basis of post-WWII cooperation between Germany and France, which has since evolved into the EU. Ironically, these were also the very ideas behind the US’ attempt to assure China’s peaceful rise starting in the 1970s, by binding it into the American-led system of liberal institutions like the World Trade Organization. The concern was that without active integration into its “rules-based” orbit, China could emerge as the epicenter of a contesting network of countries; one with less concern for free markets, human rights, and democratic elections. Regrettably, the hopes that China would one day evolve into a liberal democracy now seem all but shattered. Notorious for its outright rejection of human rights, the power of the Chinese Communist Party is as authoritarian as ever, while Xi Jinping is paving his way to unlimited rule. Keeping in mind how the international free trade regime under Washington’s guiding hand has propped up China’s economy, cutting commercial ties may stifle its growth. This may curb Xi and his party’s power by damaging their authoritarian claim to legitimacy. Vested interests, however, complicate economic disentanglement because of commercial attractions, as China is the top trading partner of both the EU and the US. The PRC’s vast consumer market is highly lucrative to Western exporters and investors, such as Germany’s car industry. Companies like Volkswagen have therefore been vocal about the damage of decoupling and strongly advocate for more cooperation. From a political perspective, a narrowed US focus on containing China could push the country’s partnership with Europe further to the back burner. Counter to Biden’s multilateral rhetoric, the hastily coordinated retreat from Afghanistan and the Australian-UK-US nuclear submarine deal were both testaments to US priorities. If the US-China rivalry escalates, the Leader of the Free World could ultimately abandon its commitment to peace by prioritizing preeminence on the world stage.

Furthermore, the world governments’ handling of the health crisis has taken the shape of a cold war style-battleground between two competing systems – the West vs. China. During the early stages of the outbreak, the Trump administration descended into chaos after it downplayed the virus’ deadliness. EU member states instinctively abandoned a united effort to manage the crisis, shutting national borders while grappling with medical supplies. Meanwhile, Beijing’s centralized and next-to absolute power allowed it to act swiftly and effectively to contain the spread – though the official Chinese numbers should be taken with a grain of salt. It was also China’s “mask diplomacy” that provided countries like Italy with desperately needed equipment. Domestically, the regime’s ability to enforce heavy-handed lockdowns, deploy digital surveillance technology, and reach deep into the private sector has proven relatively efficient. This is juxtaposed by free-market, democratic countries where government actions are limited in their ability to infringe upon personal and economic rights. As a consequence, China was the first economy able to bounce back with steady economic growth while the rest of the world was fighting recessions.

The CCP boasts this alleged victory as evidence of its authoritarian model’s superiority in allocating critical resources. It fits the narrative formulated by President Xi in 2017 that China “offers a new option for other countries and nations who want to speed up their development while preserving their independence; and it offers Chinese wisdom and a Chinese approach to solving the problems facing mankind.” The Chinese model is marketed to the rest of the world as a viable alternative to liberal democracy. Its message may resonate the strongest among government leaders with authoritarian affinities, such as Russia, Hungary, Turkey, Brazil, or India, but also investment-seeking developing countries that feel burdened by global North dominance. The hoarding of vaccines by rich countries has done little to soothe such sentiment as it has stymied widespread distribution to the world’s poorer regions. Although Europe and the US have since caught up as the largest donors of shots and bolstered the global vaccine initiative, COVAX, only 10 percent of people in low-income countries have received more than one dose. Given that the virus is blind to borders, new variants are prone to cause repeated setbacks. Austria’s recent lockdown and widespread government restrictions throughout Europe are reminders of this, even with growing optimism towards Omicron.

Overall, it is safe to say that the rift between China and the West has dug deeper with the raging pandemic. Ruptures in global supply chains have laid bare the costs of globalization. Short-term triumphs in combating the virus have been showcased particularly by China to convince the global audience of its model’s viability. As Washington and Beijing continue to indulge in zero-sum competition, where one can only gain at the expense of the other, Europe struggles to secure its own position in the international system while harmonizing political and economic interests. So far, the pandemic has exposed strengths and weaknesses of both the Chinese and Western model. But while Beijing presents its zero-Covid strategy as victorious, high infection rates in Europe question whether its vaccine campaigns will suffice to contain the virus in the long term. What is for certain is that these unfolding developments are setting the course for which system will ultimately triumph. They should thus be followed attentively.