For eighty years, nearly without variation, Washington has kept a wary eye trained on Russia. As we enter the 2020’s, tensions between the US and Russia are especially high—and the tension feels familiar. So familiar, in fact, the American public rarely questions that tension or the corresponding commitment of brainpower and cash to Russian-related concerns. Establishment figures harkening nostalgic Cold War tones; Mitt Romney naming Russia our number one geopolitical foe; Top Gun–style fighter jet intercepts between US and Russian air forces over the Black Sea—it all seems normal. Normal because, mostly, the public accepts the premise that Russia is a genuine security threat.
But that viewpoint is not universally shared. A camp of realists, including professors Barry Posen and Stephen Walt, suggest American policy overestimates the Russian threat. The Realist Camp is a minority of experts proposing that, despite decades of fear and immense investment, Americans should re-ask a long since settled question: Does Russia pose a significant threat to US interests?
Two narratives, of opposing perspectives, compete to provide an answer. The first narrative represents common thinking within the US foreign policy establishment (Washington). Washington states unequivocally that yes, Russia is a threat. Washington’s narrative holds that former KGB agent Vladimir Putin came to power, longing to rejuvenate his declining nation and re-establish Russia as a global superpower. Putin’s policies reflected his aspirations, and accordingly, Russia adopted more aggressive tactics on the international stage.
In 2008, Russia invaded its neighbor, former Soviet state Georgia. In 2014, Putin thwarted democratic processes in Ukraine, annexed Crimea and funded pro-Russian separatist fighters in eastern Ukraine—suggesting that Putin was striving to annex the entire country.
In 2016, Russia directly interfered with the presidential election. Using fake social media accounts for cyberwarfare, Russia worked to increase American political support for Donald Trump — Russia’s preferred candidate, who would presumably be softer on Russia than Hillary Clinton. The US intelligence community anticipates Russia will attempt similar interference in the upcoming 2020 election. And recently, reports surfaced that the Kremlin was offering Taliban fighters a bounty to kill US service members in Afghanistan.
Generally speaking, Washington rates Russia a plausible threat to US security at home and abroad. Russia is the only nation-state in the European region capable of striking targets in mainland America. Even today, Russia possesses a robust conventional and nonconventional arsenal. And despite draining economic problems, Russia is still committed to the rebuilding of its military. Using espionage, cyberattacks, and information warfare, Russia actively works to undermine NATO and the EU. So, despite the rise of China, Iran’s nuclear ambitions, and North Korean aggressions, Washington feels justified in dedicating substantial resources toward countering a Russian threat.
Standing in contrast to Washington’s vision of Russia, the second narrative promotes American restraint. While accepting the hard facts of the first narrative, the second narrative incorporates the Russian perspective. The second narrative conveys Russia is not a genuine threat to American interests and not worth the commitment of vast American resources.
The second narrative holds that in the mid-90’s, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia was concerned about stability in newly reunified Germany. To pacify Germany, Russia consented to the presence of NATO (and American forces) on the European continent. However, Russia was very clear on one condition: NATO was not to expand.
President Bill Clinton recognized how weak Russia was following the Soviet-collapse. Recklessly, Clinton chose to expand NATO. In 1999, NATO swelled to include the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. In 2004, NATO swallowed up Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.
As NATO crept eastward, Moscow vocally objected but was initially too weak to intervene otherwise. Undeterred, and feeling impervious to Moscow’s whining, the West began courting two nations that shared borders with Russia: Georgia and Ukraine. Meanwhile, Russia slowly regenerated itself, once again building up the strength to assert its will.
By 2008, when pro-NATO Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili attempted to reunify two separatist regions of his county, Russia was capable of foreign intervention. Putin invaded Georgia with the intention of keeping Georgia divided, thus weaker, and hence less likely to join NATO.
Meanwhile, NATO and the EU set their sights on acquiring Ukraine. A vast, open plain, Ukraine was used on three separate occasions as a portal for invading armies to reach Russia itself. Russian citizens alive today witnessed Nazi tank columns sweeping across Ukraine. Resultantly, modern Russians consider Ukraine a vital defensive buffer zone. Allowing Ukraine to become a western stronghold would be unacceptable to any rational Russian defense strategist.
So, when the US and EU began aggressively courting Ukraine through funding Ukrainian pro-western individuals and organizations, Putin felt especially threatened. Pushing back in reasonable fashion, Putin annexed Crimea. He then funded pro-Russian separatist fighters in eastern Ukraine. Striving to make the point clear, Putin took actions to demonstrate definitively: Ukraine is not available to the West. In doing so, Putin acted rationally, proportionately, and to any trained observer, predictably.
The second narrative asks, how would America react if Russia courted Mexico toward a military and political alliance? (America would never allow such a thing).
Russia is a second-tier power capable only of regional power projection. Accordingly, Russia is not strong enough to pose an existential threat to US interests. At home, Russia is hindered with a one-dimensional economy and an aging population—a cocktail for decline. Furthermore, the United States has a 10x higher military budget than Russia. Actually, Russia’s military budget is only one-fourth that of the European members of NATO.
Today, America guards against Russia as if she were a superpower, a state with the capacity and intention to project influence on a global scale. Yet, Russia is not a superpower and has not been for three decades. Therefore, America should not treat Russia as a superpower.
Russia has acted with foreseeable aggression resulting from NATO’s eastern push. Had the US-led NATO left Ukraine alone, Russia probably would not have struck beyond her borders. Had the US done less, they likely would have achieved more. The American attention invested in Russia was counterproductive. And America’s attention is needed elsewhere.
While America is blessed with abundant resources, those resources are finite. As the American international agenda diversifies, new threats emerge, and global politics shift, the hierarchy of American concerns needs to be carefully ordered. Essentially, America needs to pick its battles selectively. Russia was perhaps the most logical battle of the 20th century—but we long ago entered the 21st century. America needs to re-engage in a conversation about how to deal with Russia.
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